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Abstract 
Whether urbanisation promotes or inhibits the risk of civil war is disputed: while case stud-
ies usually support the former, quantitative investigations have found either the latter or no 
significant correlation at all. I argue that this contradiction is due to a conceptual and opera-
tional over-aggregation of urbanisation, ignoring its intrastate variation. I claim that a high 
relative concentration of the urban population and political, economic and social institutions 
in the largest city – so-called metropolisation – can increase both the motivation for and the 
feasibility of rebellion in a country. Triangulating case study evidence with a quantitative 
cross-national time-series design, I show that metropolisation significantly and robustly in-
creases the risk of governmental conflict in particular and hence civil war in general. 
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Introduction 
For the first time in history more than half of the world’s population lives in urban areas. By 
2030, this number is predicted to rise to 60 per cent
1
. According to UN estimations
2
 around 
90 per cent of global urban growth will take place in developing countries and the urban 
population living in the least developed countries will increase fivefold over the next 40 
years. Consequently, these massive shifts have caused and currently cause considerable eco-
nomic, social, demographic, and environmental changes in the affected countries. While 
cities are engines of economic growth and social development, they ‘can also be places of 
exploitation, disease, violent crime, unemployment, underemployment, and extreme pov-
erty
3
. Correspondingly, over one billion people live in urban slums today and current predic-
tions expect this number to double by 2030
4
. 
Recently, these rapid and profound urban developments have received increasing attention 
with regard to issues of conflict and civil war. A survey by UN-DESA
5
 shows that many 
governments in developing countries seem to perceive urbanisation as harmful as they ac-
tively discourage its advancement: as many as 78 per cent of African and 71 per cent of 
Asian governments state that they have implemented measures to reduce migrant flows to 
large cities. In the scholarly literature, however, the question of whether urbanisation pro-
motes or inhibits the risk of civil war is disputed. On the one hand, several case studies, e.g. 
on Kenya
6
, Indonesia
7
, or Turkey
8
, have depicted urbanisation as a cause of violence. Yet on 
the other hand, empirical studies on population and armed conflict have questioned the justi-
fication for anti-urbanisation policies, as they found no significant correlation between ur-
banisation and armed conflict
9
. I argue that this contradiction is due mainly to the fact that 
most quantitative studies have defined and measured urbanisation too broadly, that is, as the 
percentage of a country’s population living in cities (urban share) or as the growth of this 
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percentage (urban growth). This broad conceptualisation, however, ignores the intrastate 
variation of urbanisation and therefore fails to capture potential causal mechanisms between 
urbanisation and civil war. I claim that it is therefore indispensable to analyse how urbanisa-
tion is distributed within a country. Especially in African countries, urbanisation is often 
concentrated in the largest city (almost always the capital), the so-called primate city
10
. This 
condition – not process –, known as metropolisation or urban concentration, involves both 
the concentration of a country’s urban population (demographic primacy) as well as that of 
political, economic, and social institutions (functional primacy) to the largest city.  
In this paper, I suggest that metropolisation can increase both the motivation for and feasibil-
ity of rebellion and thus the risk of civil war onset. The underlying assumption in this paper 
is that social groups in a country compete both peacefully (via politics) and violently with 
each other for the control of sources of power and wealth in society, in order to improve or at 
least maintain their wellbeing. In Africa these social groups are usually defined along ethno-
regional or religious-regional lines. Crucially, in metropolised countries almost all important 
institutions that allocate sources of power and wealth are located in the capital city. In con-
trast, social groups' home regions are likely to be scarcely urbanised and therefore tend to be 
poorer and economically unfeasible as independent regions.  Hence, to ensure the group's 
and region's wellbeing, all social groups are highly motivated to control the capital and the 
state apparatus (the objective of governmental conflict) rather than seceding their region (the 
objective of territorial conflict). Using both case study and large-N methods I show that this 
tension makes civil war onset in general more likely. In addition to this motivational mecha-
nism, metropolisation makes civil war both more militarily and financially feasible as only 
the primate city has to be conquered to control the state and recruitment costs are low due to 
the widespread poverty and unemployment that typically prevail in metropolised late devel-
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oping countries. As a consequence, the collective action problem
11
 of rebels to mobilise re-
bellion, also termed as ‘Rebel’s Dilemma’ by Lichbach12, is easier to overcome. Therefore, 
based on this assumed concurrence of motivation and feasibility in metropolised countries, I 
examine the following research question: does metropolisation increase the risk of civil war 
and particularly of governmental conflict onset? 
In order to test this research question empirically, I apply two different methods. First, as 
part of explaining the paper's theoretical model, I present and analyse case study evidence 
from several African countries, with a special emphasis on the Republic of the Congo (here-
after Congo).  From this I generate three main hypotheses and test them with a cross-national 
time-series design, comparing 51 African countries from 1961 to 2010.  
In the following, the research question is analysed in five parts. First, I will provide a short 
overview of the above-mentioned urbanisation debate, thus summarizing previous arguments 
and results as well as identifying areas of controversy. Based on that, I will introduce the 
concept of metropolisation and explain in detail how it can help to gain new insights into the 
correlation of urbanisation and civil war. Part three then illustrates my research design, in-
cluding the operationalisation of the units of analysis, dependent and independent variables, 
control variables, as well as the statistical model used for testing. Then, I present the results 
and check for their robustness and causality. Finally, I summarise the survey’s findings, 
highlight limitations, and touch on future prospects. 
The Urbanisation Debate 
In the late 1960s, Paul Ehrlich’s13 neo-Malthusian14 book ‘The Population Bomb’, which 
predicted mass starvations and major societal upheaval in the remaining twentieth century 
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due to overpopulation, raised awareness towards a possible connection of population growth 
and conflict. Twenty years later, scholars, above all Homer-Dixon
15
, tested these ideas in 
large research programs. Homer-Dixon, as Goldstone
16
 four years before, came to the con-
clusion that strong urban growth along with factors such as economic crisis, institutional 
breakdown, and ethnic cleavage – as seen recently in the Arabic Spring – could lead to an 
increased risk of violence and political unrest. Case studies on Southeast Asia
17
, South Afri-
ca and Rwanda
18
, Kenya
19
 and a large qualitative comparison of Latin American, African, 
Caribbean, Asian and former Soviet Union countries by Moser et al.
20
 confirmed these find-
ings. Moreover, even Huntington
21
 argued in his well-known book on the ‘Clash of Civiliza-
tions’ that throughout the 1970s and 1980s, urbanisation led to a strengthening of radical 
Islamic movements in the Islamic World. Sayari and Hoffman
22
 exposed the close relation-
ship between ‘hyper urbanisation’ and the growth of political terrorism in Turkey during the 
same period. While these case studies point towards the positive association between urbani-
sation and conflict, only a few studies have managed to retrace this outcome in a quantitative 
manner. Through a bivariate comparison, Cincotta et al.
23
 concluded that countries with a 
high urban growth rate of four per cent or more per year are significantly twice as likely to 
face civil conflict as countries with an annual urban growth rate below one per cent. Fur-
thermore, studies by Toft
24
 and Weidmann
25
 might support the conflict-promoting character 
of urbanisation. They found that groups with a high geographical concentration, especially 
population concentration, are more likely to fight the central government. 
However, the majority of quantitative studies report opposite outcomes. Auvinen
26
 found 
that the degree of urbanisation (or urban share) is positively correlated with political protest, 
but neither with regime change nor serious forms of violent conflict. In fact, Collier and 
Hoeffler’s27 comprehensive study on civil war indicates that urbanisation is low prior to civil 
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war. They explain this finding by suggesting that low urbanisation inhibits government con-
trol, since widely spread populations are harder to reach, provide with services, and poten-
tially to fight. Since the mid-2000s, other scholars have intensively addressed different facets 
of urbanisation. In two time-series studies, one on a global level
28
 and the other comparing 
Indian states
29
, Urdal found no evidence for a connection between urban growth and armed 
conflict. Nevertheless, this work did not reject a relationship between rapid urban growth 
and violence prematurely. Rather, it argued that the negligence of conditional effects (such 
as economic shocks or levels of development), the high level of aggregation (on the country-
level), and the use of only the most severe forms of conflict as dependent variables in previ-
ous studies were possible explanations for poor results
30
. Eventually, even the correction of 
these limitations – through a design disaggregating to the city level, focusing on urban vio-
lence and integrating conditional effects – did not change their result: high urbanisation rates 
do not affect conflict
31
.  
These contradictory findings – case studies supporting the conflict-enhancing effect of ur-
banisation, and quantitative studies concluding the opposite – raise the question of who is 
right. I argue that this contradiction is due mainly to the fact that most quantitative studies 
have analysed and measured urbanisation too broadly. In fact, these studies conceptualise 
urbanisation only as growth of cities somewhere in a country, without taking into account 
which ones grow, and where. However, ignoring the intrastate variation of urbanisation ren-
ders analysts unable to discover potential causal mechanisms between urbanisation and civil 
war. For example, scholars have argued that cities are the engines of economic, political, and 
social development and that urbanisation thus decreases grievances and herewith the risk of 
civil war. However, if this is correct, analyzing a country’s general urban share does not tell 
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us whether the whole or just a small part of the country – such as the capital – profits from 
these developments. 
Moreover, I argue that a possible reason for contradictory findings is the common percep-
tion, or at least usage of, civil war as a single phenomenon. Buhaug and Gleditsch
32
, howev-
er, provide strong evidence for the argument that civil wars are in fact ‘a heterogeneous class 
of events that encompasses both efforts by peripheral groups to gain territorial concessions, 
such as autonomy or independence [territorial conflicts], and various forms of conflict within 
the centre, including revolutionary movements and military coups [governmental conflicts].’ 
As I will show in the following parts, combining this distinction between conflict incompati-
bilities with a countries pattern of urbanisation can be crucial in determining its likelihood of 
facing civil war.  
Metropolisation and Civil War 
One way to address this criticism is to focus on how urbanisation is concentrated to a coun-
try’s largest city in contrast to the remaining parts. This condition, known as metropolisation 
or urban concentration, consists of two main aspects which generally concur in a country’s 
capital. First, demographic primacy, defined as the relative concentration of the urban popu-
lation in the largest city of the country
33
 (the so-called primate city). Second, functional pri-
macy, which describes the concentration of political, social, economic, and cultural institu-
tions in the largest city. Both forms of primacy are rather pervasive in African countries: 
while Africa’s average urban share of around 30 per cent over the last 50 years was the low-
est worldwide, its average level of metropolisation of almost 38 per cent was the highest by 
far. 
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It should be emphasised at this point that the concept of metropolisation does not aim to 
measure the existence of metropolises, that is, cities which are large in absolute terms. Ra-
ther, metropolisation measures how populous a country’s largest city is relative to other cit-
ies. I will try to illustrate this with the example of the USA. Although New York is obvious-
ly an enormous metropolis, it is not a primate city since the urban population of the USA is 
spread to thousands of other cities, with ten of them having more than one million inhabit-
ants and about 34 of them having more than half a million inhabitants. Corresponding to this 
lack of demographic primacy, functional primacy is also non-existent in the USA: while the 
country’s political capital is in Washington D.C., politics are highly decentralised to the 
state-level and the economic and social centres of the USA are spread all over the nation. 
Both is reflected in the USA’s extremely low metropolisation level of 8 per cent. Similar or 
even lower levels of metropolisation can be found in other countries that are famous for their 
metropolises, such as China (2 per cent), India (6 per cent), or Indonesia (7 per cent). Thus, 
having metropolises does not mean that a country is demographically or functionally me-
tropolised.  
For further illustration, Figure 1 shows two opposite African cases of metropolisation. Cam-
eroon, on the left, is a rather typical case of low metropolisation in Africa. In 2005, about 18 
per cent of Cameroon’s urban population lived in the largest city, Douala34. Compared to the 
USA’s metropolisation level of 8 per cent, this level is still high, however compared to the 
African average of 37 per cent it is low. A look on the map explains this comparatively low 
metropolisation level of Cameroon: Yaoundé, the capital of Cameroon, is almost as popu-
lous as Douala, the largest city. Correspondingly, not only the majority of Cameroon's urban 
population is shared by these two cities but also the majority of its societal institutions: most 
political institutions are located in Yaoundé, while Douala is home to most of Cameroon’s 
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economic and social sites. Further examples for African countries with very low levels of 
metropolisation are Nigeria and South Africa, where only 14 and 11 per cent, respectively, 
of the urban population live in the largest city. Not surprisingly, in both cases the largest city 
is not the capital. 
Niger, on the other hand, is a country with a relatively high level of metropolisation. In 2011, 
around 41 per cent of the urban population lived in Niamey. Corresponding this figure, Ni-
ger’s capital is over four times larger than the second largest city, Zinder, and is as populous 
as all other eight largest cities combined
35
. Matching this demographic primacy, the func-
tional primacy of Niamey is very high: all relevant political, social, and economic institu-
tions are assembled in the capital. Further countries with very high levels of metropolisation 
include among others Congo (54 per cent), Rwanda (57 per cent), Liberia (73 per cent) and 
Djibouti (78 per cent). A complete list of African countries’ levels of metropolisation in the 
year of their last census can be found in the Annex. 
 
Figure 1: Relative population of largest cities in Cameroon (left) and Niger (right). Source: 
Own illustration. Based on country maps from CIA World Factbook (2014) and Population 
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numbers from Cameroonian and Nigerien censuses (Bureau Central du Recensement du 
Cameroun 2010; Institut National de la Statistique du Niger 2011). 
 
 
Yet, how is metropolisation related to civil war? I argue that metropolisation affects both the 
motivation for and the feasibility of civil war. Motivation encompasses the concepts of greed 
and grievances, and describes what drives people to want to rebel against the state. Feasibil-
ity, on the other hand, depicts the circumstances that allow these motivations to ignite into 
actual rebellion. Although my conceptual use of motivation and feasibility is based on the 
differentiation employed by Collier et al.
36
, neither do I agree with their previous claim that 
only greed, not also grievance, is the driving force in civil war
37
, nor with their recent asser-
tion that feasibility is more important than motivation
38
. Rather, I agree with Keen
39
 that 
conflicts are in fact complex and – as stressed by many conflict scholars40– that greed and 
grievance are complementary explanations for conflict. In line with this, I argue that neither 
greed nor feasibility alone cause conflict, but only a concurrence of motivation and feasibil-
ity. In the following part, I will first expose the mechanisms through which high metropoli-
sation can increase both the motivation and feasibility of civil war. Thereafter, I will provide 
substantial case study evidence to support these proposed mechanisms. 
Metropolisation and the Motivation for Governmental Conflict 
The key argument of this paper is that metropolisation increases the likelihood of civil war 
through increasing the motivation for governmental conflict. On the most fundamental level, 
this argument rests on conflict theory's basic assumption that social groups struggle over 
societal resources and compete for social advantages, in order to improve or at least maintain 
their wellbeing
41
. While the social lines or cleavages dividing these groups could run verti-
cally between social classes (e.g. the poor versus the wealthy), in the African context they 
  
12 
run primarily horizontally between socio-regional groups, such as ethnicities or religious 
groups
42
.  
How is metropolisation relevant in this regard?  In general, competition between socio-
regional groups will take place independently of whether a country has high or low levels of 
metropolisation. Metropolisation, however, centralises and, hence, intensifies the competi-
tion. As described above, in highly metropolised countries all or almost all relevant institu-
tions related to the allocation of sources of power and wealth are concentrated in the primate 
capital city. At the same time, the peripheral regions are – by definition – very likely to be 
scarcely urbanised
43
 and, hence, likely to be poorer and highly dependent on support from 
the central government. This has several very important implications. Secession (the objec-
tive of territorial conflict) as a means to improving one's well-being is not a viable option for 
socio-regional groups in metropolised countries. Given the likely high levels of poverty, the 
lack of economic urban centres, and, hence, a potential capital, peripheral regions in metrop-
olised countries are unlikely to be self-sufficient independently. Instead, in order to achieve 
betterment, socio-regional group have to control the government and its allocative institu-
tions, so that they can favour themselves and their regions, also known as ethnic favouritism 
or regionalism
44
. Importantly, given that all socio-regional groups aim for the same goal – 
governmental control (through control of the capital) – and that this goal has especially high 
stakes in a metropolised country, it is very likely that this particularly fierce competition will 
be contended with violent rather than just peaceful means. Thus, while decreasing the risk 
for territorial conflict, metropolisation increases the motivation and hence the likelihood of 
governmental conflict in particular and therefore civil war in general. 
Before moving to the next mechanism and supportive case study evidence, we have to ad-
dress two factors that might trouble this particular theoretical mechanism. I assumed that 
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once regional groups conquer and control the capital, they have access to the country's main 
resources, or at least the institutions that allocate these resources. Yet, is this actually true? 
For one, foreign aid has been a vital resource for most African countries. However, interna-
tional donors might not recognize governments that have gained or defended state control by 
force, hence, deny them aid and eventually make state control less attractive. Second, natural 
resources are often a key income for states in Africa, yet, are rarely located in the capital 
region. 
I will first address the concern regarding foreign aid. For most part of the 20th century inter-
national recognition was arguably not a major issue for rebels. In fact, as Herbst
45
 describes 
in some detail, both the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the international commu-
nity kept the de facto rule that the legitimate government of country is the one that controls 
the capital – independent of whether they actually control the whole territory or were per-
ceived as legitimate by their own people. Essentially, the attractiveness of controlling the 
capital was particular high during that time, thus, strengthening the proposed mechanism. 
Moreover, accession and clinging to power through means of force was the norm in Africa. 
Except for the initial independence presidents, regime changes almost never occurred 
through legal means before 1990. This, however, had never stopped donors to support them 
with substantive aid (Mobutu and Kabila in DRC are obvious examples). 
A significant turning point, however, might be the establishment of the African Union (AU) 
in 2002. The AU has a clear stance that it does not accept coup d’états or any other violent 
deposition of a democratically elected regime
46
. While arguably this has not yet prevented 
many rebels from trying to ascertain governmental control – see the recent examples of Mali, 
the Central African Republic, or Guinea Bissau – the clear rejection of these regime changes 
by the AU is likely to discourage rebels in the future. Hence, the paper's key mechanism 
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might  – and hopefully will – lose in importance in the future. Nevertheless, the AU's charter 
does not explicitly reject violent regime-change when the regime was not democratically 
legitimated. Particularly in Africa this might still leave some leeway for government control 
seeking rebels. Moreover, as this development is rather young, it does not inhibit the theoret-
ical model's explanatory power for the time frame considered in this paper.  
Now to the concerns regarding natural resources.  One could argue that even though a coun-
try is metropolised, controlling the capital does not imply the control of all relevant re-
sources, if there are resources located in regions not controlled by the state. In these cases, 
despite metropolisation, we could expect socio-regional groups to be a) less interested in the 
control of the capital as it might not give them control of the country's natural resources and 
b) more interested in seceding their territory if they are not in power and it has natural re-
sources, since independence is now feasible. While these arguments seem logical, empirical-
ly there is not much to support them. African countries we might typically think about in this 
regard, such as Sudan (and the South) as well as Nigeria (and the Niger Delta), both have 
below average levels of metropolisation. So the fact that they have resources in peripheral 
urbanised regions only strengthens the assumption that peripheral groups will want to secede 
rather than strive for governmental control in low-metropolised countries. Moreover, the 
case of South Sudan shows that we should not imprudently overestimate the importance of 
natural resources:  the Christian and Animist based rebel groups of South Sudan started their 
fight for secession from the north ten years before the first oil fields were actually discovered 
in the South in 1972. 
Congo and Sierra Leone are two highly metropolised cases which further defuse the assumed 
limitations a bit. In Sierra Leone, Foday Sankoh's Revolutionary United Front  controlled the 
country's main diamond fields located in the East, yet never aimed to secede the territory. 
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Rather, as would be predicted by our model, all conflict parties strived for the control of the 
capital, Freetown. The case of Congo further shows that our proposed mechanism does not 
necessarily become ineffective when resources are outside of a social groups own region and 
the capital. The main oil wealth of the country lies offshore before the second largest city 
Pointe Noire in the west of the country, dominated by the Kikongo ethnicity. Yet, the 
Kikongo never tried to secede this territory but always strived for control of Brazzaville. The 
importance of the capital Brazzaville – despite the fact that Point-Noire is also relevant – can 
be seen by the fact that when the main battles against Sassou-Nguesso and his Mbochi Cobra 
Militias were fought and lost by the Kikongo in Brazzaville, Pointe-Noire fell to Sassou-
Nguesso's Cobra militias without resistance two days later. While some parts in the Pool 
region (dominated by the Teke Ninja militias) were still not under the total control of the 
government, the most important parts and cities of Congo fell to the rebels the moment they 
conquered the capital. Generally, while they might not be extraction sites of natural re-
sources, primate cities in metropolised countries are a valuable resource themselves. The 
reason for their existence is often a geographically and economically valuable location, such 
on a river (Brazzaville at the Congo River), a bay or a coastal peninsula (such as Freetown) 
Nevertheless, countries facing territorial conflict despite high levels of metropolisation exist. 
Natural resources, among other factors, certainly play a role. Senegal and the Casamance 
region comes to mind. This southern region is dominated by a Senegalese minority ethnicity 
(the Diola), is very fertile, has a viable urban centre with coastal Zuiguinchor, and important-
ly, is geographically separated from the rest of the country by Gambia. In this particular 
case, this variety of factors seems to make territorial rather than governmental conflict more 
feasible. Hence, I conclude that natural resources and other factors such as history, external 
actors, and the geographic conditions naturally play an important intervening or mediating 
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role for the relationship between metropolisation and civil war. By and large, however, they 
do not seem to distort the proposed mechanism to an extent that would fundamentally ques-
tion its explanatory power.  
Metropolisation and the Feasibility of Civil War  
The second main mechanism linking metropolisation to civil war is related to feasibility. 
What often makes conflict unfeasible and stops individuals to collectively mobilise their 
motivation into rebellion is the well-known collective action problem
47
 or the ‘Rebel’s Di-
lemma’ as Lichbach48 terms it. The Rebel’s Dilemma states that it is very difficult to start 
and mobilise a rebellion because of the high incentive for individuals to try to ‘free ride’ on 
the eventual benefits of rebellion while avoiding the large (opportunity) costs of rebelling
49
.  
In his paper on ‘Rethinking Rationality and Rebellion’, Lichbach50 identifies several solu-
tions to the Rebel’s Dilemma, two of them being ‘lower costs’ and ‘increasing the probabil-
ity of winning’. I argue that metropolisation can facilitate both these solutions. As mentioned 
above, high opportunity costs – such as leaving one's family or safe income from employ-
ment – disincentivise rebellion. In highly metropolised countries, however, participation 
costs are low for many potential dissidents. Henderson
51
, based on a UN city dataset, shows 
that demographic primacy in a country increases child mortality, pupil-teacher ratios, use of 
non-potable water, and other grievances in both the primate city itself but also the periphery. 
In addition, Bronger
52
 argues that primate cities are marked by ‘increasing  un-  and  under-
employment,  expansion  of slum-  and  squatter areas together with  the  marginalisation of  
their  inhabitants’. This assessment by Bronger is sustained by the UN-Habitat’s53 estimates 
that the highest poverty rate in the world prevails in metropolitan regions in sub-Saharan 
Africa, with over 60 per cent of its urban population living in slums, excluded from any form 
of socio-economic development. Hence, due to strong deprivation, both in the primate city 
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and in the periphery, highly metropolised countries have a great number of unemployed or 
low-income workers that face very low opportunity costs of participating in uprisings or re-
bellions. That is, it is easier for the leaders of socio-regional groups to find coethnics willing 
to fight for their cause. 
Lichbach also describes that potential dissidents will rebel if they become convinced that 
collective dissent will likely achieve the 'public good' they seek. As argued above, in a me-
tropolised country this public good is likely to be governmental control. To obtain it, rebels 
have to conquer the main seats of political, economic, and social power. In countries with 
low levels of metropolisation, such as Nigeria, rebels are more likely to have to conquer 
many cities in order to control the most relevant parts and institutions of the countries. In 
countries with high metropolisation, however, rebels would "only" have to conquer the pri-
mate city to attain their goal. As a consequence, potential dissidents might perceive the prob-
ability of winning as higher and are therefore more willing to join the rebellion, hereby over-
coming the Rebel’s Dilemma. And in fact, their perception might be right as our above-
mentioned Congo example demonstrates.  When Brazzaville fell to Sassou-Nguesso in Oc-
tober 1997, the country’s only other relevant city – the coastal city and oil hub Pointe-Noire 
– also fell to his forces without resistance. Essentially, Brazzaville was the passe-partout to 
gaining control of all other important sites of the country.  Concluding, metropolisation thus 
not only increases the motivation for civil war but also its feasibility.  
Case Study Evidence from Congo and other African Countries 
As mentioned above, there is substantial case study evidence from Africa supporting the 
theoretical model. Congo is one such case. With over 42% of the country’s urban population 
living in the capital Brazzaville, Congo can be considered a highly metropolised country. 
After a move to multi party democracy in the early 1990s, the central African country has 
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seen a range of high-intensity armed conflicts over the control of government between the 
country’s three main political leaders and their respective militias representing Congo's three 
main regional-based ethnicities. First, former and current President Sassou-Nguesso and his 
Cobra Militia from the Mbochi ethnicity, which stems from the sparsely populated and drier 
northern region of Congo. Second, former president Lissouba and his Coyote militia from 
Congo's largest ethnicity, the Kikongo, which primarily inhabit the southwestern part of the 
country. Finally, former prime minister Kolelas and his Ninja militia from the Teke ethnici-
ty, which dominate the country’s central "Pool" region surrounding Brazzaville. Supporting 
the feasibility argument, the militias were mainly recruited from young unemployed men 
from Brazzaville belonging to the respective ethnicities
54
.  
What is of central importance here is that none of the three ethno-regional groups, although 
rather clearly segregated geographically, ever tried to secede its territory. Obviously, as the 
Teke live mainly around and in the capital it would not make a lot of sense for them to se-
cede. Yet, this argument should not hold true for the two other ethnicities. The example of 
the Mbochi ethnicity led by President Sassou-Nguesso, however, illustrates why they always 
strived for governmental control. As mentioned above, the Mbochi's northern home region is 
very sparsely populated, has no relevant cities (the largest had only 23,000 inhabitants in 
2014 – compared to over 1.3 million inhabitants in Brazzaville), no mentionable natural re-
sources and is rather arid. In short, seceding this poor region is an extremely unattractive 
target. Controlling the capital and hence the country’s wealth allocating institutions, on the 
other hand, is a much more promising and rewarding target. In line with this, Mbochi elites 
putsched themselves to power and largely favoured their region and people for over 14 
years
55
. Their rule was interrupted in 1992 by a short period of democracy and Kikongo rule 
(under Lissouba). Yet, former president and Mbochi leader Sassou-Nguesso had not given 
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up his objective of governmental control, and shortly before the 1997 presidential elections 
fighting broke out in Brazzaville between the countries three main ethnicities. After four 
month of civil war, aided militarily by the Angolans and financially by the French, Sassou-
Nguesso had won back Brazzaville and with it governmental control of most of the country. 
Confirming our theoretical model, favouritism for the northern Mbochi dominated region 
returned to its high pre 1992 levels.  
Similar patterns can be found in many other highly metropolised countries in Africa. The 
recent civil war in the Central African Republic is such a case. Rather than wanting to secede 
their sparsely populated, dry, barely urbanized and, hence, poor northern region, the Seleka 
rebels – claiming to fight for the country's Muslim minority – attacked and conquered the 
primate city Bangui in 2013. Importantly, this case shows that it is irrelevant whether the 
conflict emerges directly in the capital or – as in the Central African Republic – in the pe-
riphery. The key is that although their fight was confined to the northern territory for a long 
time, the Seleka rebels always clearly articulated their objective of governmental control. 
Similarly, the Muslim Ivorians (lead by Alassane Ouattara) which dominate the less urban-
ised and poorer north of the Ivory Coast always aimed for governmental control rather than 
secession. Further examples among many are the highly metropolised countries Djibouti, 
Liberia, Uganda or Togo in which peripheral ethnicities always strived for (access to) gov-
ernmental control rather than territorial control. 
On the other side of the coin, in countries with below average levels of metropolisation – 
such as Sudan, Ethiopia, or Nigeria – we more often see social groups trying to secede. Giv-
en low metropolisation, it is more likely that peripheral social groups have their own large 
cities and, hence, territories which could survive independently. As a consequence, territorial 
secession is often a more promising path to increasing one’s power and regional well-being 
  
20 
than trying to conquer the less important capital. In the case of Ethiopia for example, both 
the Eritrean and Djiboutian ethno-regional groups strived for independence. The respective 
regional urbanization surely played a central role. With large port cities as Asmara (649,000 
inhabitants) and Djibouti (ca. 600,000 inhabitants) as potential capitals, the regions’ social 
groups knew that they could survive as independent states, in fact, be better off. The same is 
true for the South Sudanese and Juba (obviously the location of oil in the South added to the 
viability of independence) and northern and southeastern secessionist movements in Nigeria. 
Even in Europe we find examples for this. In Spain both the Catalans and the Basques have 
strong regional capitals with Barcelona and Bilbao and hence, rather than investing their 
resources into controlling political power in Madrid, aim for more autonomy and independ-
ence.  
Finally, what does this imply for civil war onset in general, that is, the aggregate of the two? 
Since governmental conflict onset is more likely in highly metropolised countries while terri-
torial conflict onset is less likely, we might assume that the two would simply balance each 
other out, thus, leaving the overall likelihood of civil war unchanged. This assumption, how-
ever, is fallacious. As argued above, regional groups in metropolised countries are much 
more likely to be in (violent) conflict with each other, since they all have to control the capi-
tal to ensure their well-being. Regional groups in non-metropolised countries, however, do 
not necessarily want to fight for secession. Perhaps, their status-quo is already a de-facto 
autonomy, and fighting for secession is redundant. Moreover, the central government could 
solve potential conflicts much easier by granting de-jure autonomy or pursuing decentralisa-
tion reforms
56
. Hence, overall we would expect metropolisation's governmental conflict en-
hancing effect to be stronger than its territorial conflict reducing effect. Following the de-
tailed discussions above, I propose two main hypotheses: 
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H1: The higher the level of metropolisation in a country, the more likely is govern-
mental conflict onset. 
H2: The higher the level of metropolisation in a country, the more likely is the risk of 
civil war onset in general. 
Research Design 
To triangulate the case study evidence provided above, I compare 51 African states from 
1961 to 2010
57
 using quantitative methods. The period chosen for the analysis is primarily 
bound to the availability of metropolisation data
58
. The unit of analysis for this panel design 
is the country-year. In total, the dataset consists of exactly 2,353 country-years. The statisti-
cal analysis is conducted in Stata 12. 
Dependent Variables 
For the operationalisation of my conflict variables, I rely on conflict data from the 
UCDP/PRIO Onset of Intrastate Armed Conflict dataset
59
, which is a country-year version of 
the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset
60
. The latest release of this dataset includes every 
violent conflict between a state government and an organised opposition group that caused at 
least 25 annual battle-deaths between 1946 and 2011. Since this survey is mainly concerned 
with the risk – not duration, end, or severity – of civil war, only the conflict outbreaks are 
coded as conflict onsets and following conflict years are dropped from the analysis. Howev-
er, in cases of discontinuous events, that is, if a conflict falls below the threshold of 25 
deaths for at least two years and then resumes with the same parties and over the same in-
compatibility, I code the conflict as a separate conflict onset.  
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What is beneficial to this study is that the UCDP/PRIO dataset has classified all conflicts as 
concerning either territorial or governmental issues. This allows me to test assumption that 
the relationship between metropolisation and civil war onset is caused by the increase in 
governmental conflict rather than territorial conflict.  Accordingly, I will include three de-
pendent variables – civil war onset, governmental conflict onset, and territorial conflict onset 
– which are all coded dichotomously: 1 for the onset of conflict and 0 for peace years. Con-
sequently, I calculate three logit regression models, which account for the binary conflict 
variables. 
 
Explanatory Variable 
Metropolisation is measured with the World Bank
61
 indicator ‘Population living in the larg-
est city (per cent of urban population)’. The data is available for the period 1961-2010. Me-
tropolisation, or rather urban primacy, is often measured through a standard rank-size meas-
ure, that is, in terms of the relative size of the largest to the second largest city. I argue, how-
ever, that using this operationalisation of metropolisation is not feasible, necessary, and most 
importantly not valid for our theoretical model. For one, data availability is surprisingly 
poor. There are two main data sets from the UN
62
 that list city sizes over a range of time. 
However, their population size threshold for a city to be included is so high that they exclude 
a large part of African countries' largest and second largest cities. Moreover, their often very 
short time coverage is largely insufficient for our evaluation period from 1960 to 2010.  
The good news is that metropolisation as I measure it and the rank-size measure seem to 
correlate very highly. Using the data sources above I created a cross-sectional dataset (see 
Annex) of all African countries including their rank-size measure at the point of their last 
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census. For countries the UN sources did not cover, I had to relied on the estimates proposed 
by Wikipedia and cross-checked these to the best of my knowledge with other online 
sources. Fortunately, yet not surprisingly, metropolisation and rank-size correlate very high-
ly at 0.7.  
Finally and importantly, I would argue that metropolisation itself is a more valid measure 
than rank-size for the key motivational measure discussed above. What we can see from the 
table in the Annex is that all countries with above-average levels of metropolisation have 
primate cities (in terms of rank-size, cities which are at least twice as large as the second 
largest city) and functional primacy, yet, not all countries with primate cities have high me-
tropolisation (which is the reason why we do not have perfect collinearity between the two 
measures) and functional primacy. Lagos for example is two and half times as large as the 
second largest city in Nigeria, yet – given the very low metropolisation level of 12.48% - the 
country is relatively decentralised and the political capital is in Abuja. Ethiopia is one of 
these few cases that run counter to the high correlation of metropolisation and rank-size. 
While only 23% (the African average is 38%) of its urban population lived in the capital, 
Addis Ababa, its rank-size is in the highest quintile of all African cases. That is, Addis Aba-
ba is over seven times more populated than the second largest city Mekele. Just looking at 
the rank-size measurement, we would think that there is only one important city in Ethiopia: 
Addis Ababa. In fact, however, we see that all regions in Ethiopia have relatively large and 
important cities (all with at least 200.000 inhabitants). While the high rank-size measure fails 
to capture this pattern, the low metropolisation level fares much better. And as mentioned 
above, this pattern is crucial for our theoretical model. In such non-metropolised contexts 
regional social groups have a larger incentive to secede their territory – as seen with the for-
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mer Ethiopian regions Eritrea and Djibouti – or at least ask for more decentralisation and 
autonomy. 
Control Variables 
Based on James Lee Ray’s63 strategy and criteria for the careful use of control variables, I 
include several control variables which are theoretically both correlated with civil war and 
metropolisation, and their exclusion would therefore lead to omitted variable bias.   The first 
variable I control for is the level of urbanisation, measured as the percentage of a country’s 
population living in cities. As elaborated in the second part of this paper, urbanisation might 
be positively or negatively correlated with civil war. At the same time, Mutlu
64
 finds that the 
greater the size of the urban population in a polity is, the less likely is urban primacy. There-
fore, urbanisation might be a confounding variable. The data is provided by the World 
Bank
65
. Collinearity, however, should not be an issue (the same is true for all control varia-
bles), since metropolisation and urbanisation correlate negatively at a very low -0.08 
Country size and population density are two further variables which have been found to de-
termine both civil war
66
 and metropolisation
67
. Therefore, I include a log-transformed varia-
ble of country size as well as population density, which is calculated based on population 
and country size data from the World Bank
68
. 
One of the most robust findings in the quantitative conflict literature is that countries with 
low levels of development, proxied by GDP per capita, have an exceptionally high risk of 
civil war
69
. Similarly, demographers have found that low per capita incomes increase the 
likelihood of metropolisation
70
. Thus, finding a positive association between metropolisation 
and armed conflict might just be a spurious correlation due to the omission of the level of 
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development. To control for this, I include the logarithm of GDP per capita at constant pric-
es, drawn from the Penn World Table
71
. 
One of the most investigated potential determinants of civil war is ethnic fractionalisation. 
Although findings on whether ethnic fractionalisation is significantly correlated with conflict 
are ambiguous
72
, I believe controlling for it is essential, as interestingly ethnic fractionalisa-
tion is also found by Mutlu
73
 to be negatively associated with high metropolisation. The var-
iable I include is based on Fearon’s74 update of the ethno-linguistic fractionalisation index 
(ELF). The ELF takes on values between 0 and 1 and indicates the probability of two ran-
domly drawn persons in a country belonging to different ethnic groups, one being the highest 
probability. 
Rough terrain might also be a cause of spurious correlation. On the one hand, rough terrain 
might force urbanisation to be concentrated to few locations and thus cause metropolisa-
tion
75
. On the other, especially Fearon and Laitin
76
 argue that insurgency is favoured by 
rough terrain. To control that it is not rough terrain but actually metropolisation that increas-
es the risk of conflict onset, I include Fearon and Laitin’s77 rough terrain variable, which 
denotes the proportion of the country that is ‘mountainous’. 
Finally, civil wars cluster in space as well as in time
78
. To account for spatial dependence, 
that is, that a conflict diffuses to a neighbouring country I include a dummy variable, which 
is coded 0 when all neighbouring countries are peaceful and 1 if one or more neighbouring 
countries faces civil war. Moreover, panel data is very likely to suffer from serial depend-
ence in that the conflict status of a country-year is related to its status in the previous year
79
. 
In this study, the problem is dealt by coding only the onset of conflict as ‘1’ rather than all 
years and thus dropping consecutive years of conflict from the analysis. However, this does 
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not solve the problem for temporal correlation entirely because periods of peace (coded as 
‘0’) will still be correlated over time. I account for this temporal dependency by using the 
simple yet effective cubic approximation method endorsed by Carter and Signorino
80
. First, I 
generate a control variable measuring the number of years in peace since the previous con-
flict, termed peace years. This peace year variable is then included as regressor (t) in the test 
regression together with its squared and cubed equivalents (t² and t³).  
Results 
Before moving to the models which include all independent variables, I first present models 
of conflict onset which are as limited as possible, that is, using simple bivariate logit regres-
sions. These three models are presented in Table 1.  Supporting hypotheses one, metropolisa-
tion significantly relates positively to governmental. Metropolisation's negative and signifi-
cant association with territorial conflict onset furthermore confirms our assumption that high 
levels of metropolisation make territorial conflict more unlikely. The relationship between 
the aggregate of the two, civil war, and metropolisation is positive as expected, yet, not sig-
nificant. This appears to oppose our second hypothesis. In fact, the simple bivariate regres-
sion models seem to imply that the opposed relationships between metropolisation and the 
two conflict types neutralise one another once aggregated.  
Table 1. Simple Bivariate Logit Regression Models of Civil War Onset, 1961-2010 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Civil War  
Onset 
Governmental Con-
flict Onset 
Territorial  
Conflict Onset 
Metropolisation 0.00698 0.0182*** -0.0364** 
 (1.08) (2.60) (-2.54) 
 
Constant -3.317*** -4.148*** -3.089*** 
 (-12.03) (-12.94) (-6.49) 
Observations 1987 2067 2224 
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Pseudo R
2 0.002 0.011 0.024 
Note: t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
The results of the multivariate logit regression models summarised in Table 2, however, pro-
vide broad support for hypotheses one and three. While the negative partial association be-
tween territorial conflict and metropolisation becomes insignificant, that of civil war is now 
positive and significant at the 10%-level. Moreover, holding all other control variables con-
stant, the partial correlation between metropolisation and governmental conflict remains 
highly significant. Given these results, the evidence does in fact suggest that metropolisation 
is associated with civil war in general and that this association is mediated by the effect of 
metropolisation on governmental conflict, rather than through territorial conflict.  
Table 2. Multivariate Logit Regression Models of Civil War Onset, 1961-2010 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Civil War  
Onset 
Governmental  
Conflict Onset 
Territorial  
Conflict Onset 
Explanatory Variable 
 
 
Metropolisation 0.0174* 0.0259*** -0.0148 
 (1.95) (2.65) (-0.66) 
 
Control Variables 
 
   
Urbanisation 0.0145 0.00277 0.0277 
 (1.42) (0.24) (1.23) 
Country size (log) 0.493*** 0.316** 1.085*** 
 (3.57) (2.16) (3.08) 
Population density 0.00430* 0.00314 0.00659 
 (1.87) (1.22) (1.30) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.332* -0.221 -0.398 
 (-1.66) (-0.97) (-0.98) 
Ethnic fractionalisation 0.833 0.688 0.768 
 (1.40) (1.02) (0.61) 
Mountain 0.0183*** 0.00492 0.0469*** 
 (2.97) (0.65) (4.37) 
 
Controls for Statistical Dependency 
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Neighbour Conflict 0.559** 0.714** 0.185 
 (2.13) (2.34) (0.37) 
Peace years -0.197*** -0.103 -0.551*** 
 (-2.97) (-1.38) (-3.35) 
Peace years² 0.00988** 0.00502 0.0307** 
 (2.33) (1.09) (2.57) 
Peace years³ -0.000138* -0.0000663 -0.000471** 
 (-1.96) (-0.89) (-2.09) 
Constant -8.667*** -7.578*** -16.24** 
 (-3.35) (-2.74) (-2.45) 
Observations 1897 1891 1894 
Pseudo R
2
 0.106 0.060 0.343 
Note: t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
This influence of metropolisation on civil war and governmental conflict can be expressed in 
numbers. For an ‘average’ country with median values on all independent variables, the 
probability for governmental conflict onset in any given year is 2.5 per cent. If the level of 
metropolisation is increased to the 95th percentile (over 65 per cent metropolisation) while 
maintaining the other variables at their median, the probability of conflict more than doubles 
to 5.2 per cent. Average countries, however, with a level of metropolisation at the fifth per-
centile (under 13 per cent metropolisation) face governmental conflict with a probability of 
only 1.3 per cent. To put this in more understandable terms: a country where at least 65 per 
cent of the urban population lives in the capital is four times more at risk to have a govern-
mental conflict than a country with less than 13 per cent of the urban population living in the 
capital. A graphical illustration of this relationship is shown in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2: The effect of metropolisation on the probability for governmental conflict in an 
‘average country.’ Note: The graph is simulated on the basis of Model 5, Table 2, with the 
aid of Stata 12. All control variables are held at their mean values. 
 
For an alternative interpretation of these results, we can visualise how metropolisation af-
fects conflict risk in a hypothetical worst-case scenario country, that is, a country with all 
significant civil war determinants at their most conflict-prone values. According to the re-
sults in Table 2, a worst-case scenario country would have a population density of 216 peo-
ple per square kilometre or more, a country size of two million square kilometres or greater, 
a GDP per capita of 403$ or less, a neighbouring country in conflict, and at least 73 per cent 
of the country covered with mountains. When increasing metropolisation from the fifth to 
the 95
th
 percentile in a country with all the least favourable characteristics, Model 4 predicts 
the probability for civil war onset to rise from 44 per cent to 66 per cent. This large change 
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illustrates the enormous effect metropolisation can have in countries which are already prone 
to conflict. For a graphical illustration of this relationship, see Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3: The Effect of Metropolisation on the Probability for Civil War in a ‘Worst-Case 
Country.’ Note: The graph is simulated on the basis of Model 4, Table 2, with the aid of 
Stata 12. All control variables significantly related to civil war are held at their most conflict 
promoting manifestation. 
 
 
In conclusion, this analysis has demonstrated that the introduction of the metropolisation 
variable adds new valuable insights into the correlates of civil war. The results have shown 
that metropolisation increases the risk of civil war in general and governmental conflict in 
particular, while not having a significant correlation with territorial conflict. This confirms 
both hypotheses of this paper, namely that metropolisation increases the risk of civil war and 
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that this relationship is mediated through the association between metropolisation and gov-
ernmental conflict. Interestingly, this paper confirms that urbanisation in its broad form has 
no significant relationship with civil war – even the distinction between governmental and 
territorial conflict could not add any explanatory power to this variable. 
Robustness and Causality Checks 
To provide more evidence that the results obtained are generally valid, I conduct a number of 
robustness checks (the results are presented in Table 3). First, I check whether using a higher 
casualty threshold alters the results. Therefore, I re-estimate Models 4 and 5, however, re-
placing the relatively low threshold of 25 battle-deaths per year by 1,000 battle-related 
deaths per year (respective data is included in the UCDP/PRIO conflict onset dataset). Alt-
hough the smaller number of conflicts could be expected to lead to larger standard errors and 
less significant estimates, both civil war and governmental conflict are significantly correlat-
ed with metropolisation at the 5%-level and 1%-level respectively.  
Second, I try to reduce the risk of omitted variable bias by calculating a conditional (fixed 
effects) logit regression model, which is grouped at the country level. The conditional logit 
regression accounts for all country specific variables which are invariant over time. This 
includes variables such as culture, which are difficult to measure and therefore often omitted, 
but also variables such as country size, ethnic fractionalisation and rough terrain, which are 
already included in the model. When using conditional logit regressions, the positive asso-
ciations between metropolisation and both civil war onset and governmental conflict onset 
remain significant at the 5%-level. 
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Table 3. Robustness Checks 
 Model 7 
1000 Battled Related   
Threshold 
Model 8 
Conditional Logit  
Regression 
 Civil War 
Onset 
Gov. Conflict 
Onset 
Civil War 
Onset 
Gov. Conflict 
Onset 
Explanatory Variable 
 
   
Metropolisation 0.083** 0.126*** 0.0418** 0.0471** 
(2.20) (2.71) (2.12) (2.28) 
Metropolisation t-1     
     
Control Variables 
  
   
Urbanisation -0.025 -0.045 -0.085*** -0.093*** 
 (-0.81) (-1.32) (-3.31) (-3.51) 
Country size (log) 3.019*** 3.352*** 0.018** 0.021** 
(3.69) (3.26) (2.38) (2.49) 
Population density 0.031*** 0.037*** -0.099 -0.046 
(3.52) (3.51) (-0.21) (-0.09) 
GDP p.c. (log) 1.386** 1.883*** -15.92* -21.33* 
(2.22) (2.64) (-1.74) (-1.85) 
Ethnic fraction. 4.245** 4.868** -0.085*** -0.093*** 
(2.02) (2.05) (-3.31) (-3.51) 
Mountain 0.064*** 0.043** 0.0188** 0.0211** 
 (3.72) (2.09) (2.38) (2.49) 
 
Controls for Statistical Dependency 
 
  
Neighb. Conflict 0.695 1.897 1.087*** 0.764** 
(0.96) (1.55) (3.17) (1.97) 
Peace years -0.68*** -0.524* 0.0469 0.0894 
 (-2.61) (-1.95) (0.56) (0.95) 
Peace years² 0.045* 0.034 -0.00424 -0.00569 
 (1.92) (1.51) (-0.77) (-0.94) 
Peace years³ -0.0008 -0.0006 0.000157 0.000168 
 (-1.52) (-1.22) (1.58) (1.58) 
Constant -61.5*** -72.7***   
 (-3.81) (-3.60)   
Observations 1825 1893 1497 1360 
Pseudo R
2
 0.441 0.346 0.094 0.097 
Note: t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Third, I want to test for causality. Research by Beall et al.
81
 has shown that ‘cities can some-
times serve as places of refuge or relative security during conflict’. Therefore, it might be 
that not metropolisation causes civil war but the other way around, since the population from 
other cities might seek refuge in the capital and thus increase the countries degree of me-
tropolisation. In fact, Liberia gives some evidence for this ‘eye of the storm’ hypothesis82: 
before the re-eruption of governmental conflict in 2000 the level of metropolisation actually 
decreased (from 58 per cent in 1998 to 51 per cent in 1997), while during the first conflict 
year and afterwards it increased rapidly (first to 54 per cent in 2000 and then 57 per cent in 
2001). Of course, it has to be noted that the pre-conflict metropolisation level of 51 per cent 
was already extremely high and therefore consistent with the paper’s hypotheses. Neverthe-
less, by lagging the metropolisation variable by one, two, three, five and ten years, I intent to 
account for this potential endogeneity problem. In all models the association between gov-
ernmental conflict onset and metropolisation remains strong and highly significant. Table 4 
presents the models including the one, two, and ten year lags. This provides strong evidence 
that the above found results are not flawed by reversed causation. Finally, identifying and 
omitting potential outliers with the Cook’s D method does not change the findings’ validity 
either. 
Table 4. Causality Checks: Lagging of Metropolisation by One to Ten Years 
 Model 9 
Lagged t-1 
Model 10 
Lagged t-2 
Model 11 
Lagged t-10 
 Civil 
War  
Onset 
Gov.  
Conflict 
Onset 
Civil 
War  
Onset 
Gov. 
Conflict 
Onset 
Civil 
War  
Onset 
Gov. 
Conflict 
Onset 
Explanatory Variable 
 
Metropolisation 0.0161
*
 0.0258
***
 0.0149
*
 0.0247
***
 0.0190
**
 0.0284
***
 
 (1.83) (2.67) (1.70) (2.58) (1.98) (2.72) 
       
Control Variables       
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Urbanization 0.0143 0.00543 0.0114 0.00328 0.0154 0.0105 
 (1.40) (0.48) (1.11) (0.29) (1.27) (0.78) 
Country size (log) 0.483
***
 0.315
**
 0.459
***
 0.296
**
 0.454
***
 0.303
*
 
 (3.46) (2.13) (3.29) (2.00) (2.91) (1.80) 
Population density 0.00347 0.00285 0.00299 0.00246 0.00153 0.00158 
 (1.46) (1.06) (1.24) (0.91) (0.57) (0.51) 
Ethnic fraction. 0.618 0.416 0.569 0.383 0.280 0.295 
 (1.02) (0.61) (0.93) (0.56) (0.40) (0.37) 
Mountain 0.0186
***
 0.00479 0.0181
***
 0.00445 0.0203
***
 0.00728 
 (2.97) (0.62) (2.87) (0.57) (2.84) (0.80) 
GDP p.c. -0.00017
*
 -0.00015 -0.0001
*
 -0.00014 -0.0002
*
 -0.0001 
 (-1.81) (-1.44) (-1.71) (-1.37) (-1.91) (-1.58) 
       
Controls for Statistical Dependency 
       
Neighbor Conflict 0.558
**
 0.802
**
 0.513
*
 0.773
**
 0.444 0.692
*
 
 (2.09) (2.51) (1.91) (2.41) (1.49) (1.94) 
Peace years -0.240
***
 -0.113 -0.263
***
 -0.133
*
 -0.262
***
 -0.124 
 (-3.53) (-1.48) (-3.82) (-1.71) (-3.58) (-1.48) 
Peace years² 0.0123
***
 0.00582 0.0134
***
 0.00674 0.0132
***
 0.00624 
 (2.86) (1.24) (3.08) (1.43) (2.86) (1.25) 
Peace years³ -0.00017
**
 -0.00007 -0.0001
**
 -0.00008 -0.0001
**
 -0.00008 
 (-2.39) (-1.02) (-2.56) (-1.18) (-2.37) (-1.03) 
Constant -10.21
***
 -8.805
***
 -9.581
***
 -8.299
***
 -9.405
***
 -8.603
***
 
 (-4.73) (-3.84) (-4.43) (-3.63) (-3.83) (-3.22) 
Observations 1866 1860 1823 1817 1488 1482 
Pseudo R
2
 0.112 0.067 0.115 0.067 0.125 0.073 
Note: t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Conclusion 
Urbanisation is arguably one of the central demographic and socio-economic trends of our 
time. It is inextricably linked with economic growth and social development. While govern-
ments seem to be relatively unified in the assumption that urbanisation is harmful and there-
fore implement policies to curb urban growth rates, the literature is divided on this topic: 
case studies have largely described urbanisation as a factor promoting conflict and civil war, 
while the vast majority of quantitative studies has found either the opposite or no significant 
relationship at all. 
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In this paper, I claimed that these contradictions are due to a conceptual and operational 
over-aggregation of urbanisation, which neglected the importance of how urbanisation dis-
tributes throughout a country. I argued that high metropolisation, that is, the concentration of 
a country’s urbanisation in the capital, could increase the risk of civil war for one main rea-
son: high metropolisation increases both the motivation for and the feasibility of rebellion. 
High levels of metropolisation imply that most sources of wealth and power are located in 
the country's capital, and that peripheral regions are likely to be sparsely urbanised and 
therefore poor. Hence, in order to secure their wellbeing, all socio-regional groups will want 
to control the capital and the state apparatus (the objective of governmental conflict), rather 
than seceding their unviable regions (the objective of territorial conflict). This intense con-
flict of interests over governmental control makes the use of violence more likely and, thus, 
increases the overall likelihood of civil war. On the other hand, high levels of metropolisa-
tion make conflicts both militarily and financially feasible as only the largest city has to be 
conquered to control the state and recruitment costs are low due to the widespread poverty 
and unemployment that typically prevail in metropolised late developing countries.  
To empirically test these assumptions, I first analysed case study evidence and then used a 
cross-national time-series design comparing 51 African states from 1961 to 2010. The results 
largely confirmed the hypothesis: metropolisation is significantly and robustly associated 
with civil war in general and governmental conflict in particular. Territorial conflict is nega-
tively, yet, not significantly correlated with higher levels of metropolisation. As expected, 
urbanisation in its broad sense has no significant correlation with civil war – neither with 
territorial nor with governmental conflict. In terms of policy recommendation, these findings 
do not support the perception of state officials that urbanisation is generally harmful. How-
ever, they stress that metropolisation can indeed increase the likelihood of civil war. There-
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fore, a possible recommendation could be the creation of political institutions that encourage 
peaceful political bargaining and accommodation at the centre
83
 or try to reduce metropolisa-
tion by promoting decentralisation policies
84
. 
While the study’s findings provide new insights, they are definitely not the end of the story. 
The quality of urbanisation data and especially the cross-national design severely restricted 
this study. The general problem with studies using states as units of analysis is that they ig-
nore intrastate variation
85
. I tried to mitigate this problem by approximating the local varia-
tion of urbanisation in a country through metropolisation. However, while metropolisation 
can denote how urbanisation is concentrated in the capital in contrast to the rest of the coun-
try, it does not indicate where exactly urbanisation occurs in the remaining parts and how 
this to relates to other factors, such as natural resources. Hegre and Raleigh
86
 as well as 
Buhaug and Rod
87
 showed in their geographically disaggregated studies that location and 
environment of cities matter. Therefore, I agree with Buhaug and Urdal
88
 that using geo-
graphically disaggregated analyses or preferably two-level analysis as suggested by 
Weidmann
89
 – combining both aggregated and disaggregated levels – is necessary to sub-
stantially validate the results obtained above and to advance the research field. Concluding, 
this study provides support for previous quantitative studies that indeed urbanisation in its 
broad sense does not seem to influence the risk of civil war. However, the significant rela-
tionship between metropolisation and civil war shows that, in fact, demographics can be 
dangerous and should therefore be considered more closely in policy and in research.  
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Annex: African Countries Sorted By Level of Metropolization 
Country Year of  
Respective 
Census 
Level of  
Metropolization 
 (in per cent) 
Level of  
Urbanization 
(in per cent) 
Largest to second 
largest city ratio 
South Africa 2005 11.66 59.26 1.88 
Tunisia 1998 12.01 62.65 2.82 
Algeria 1998 12.48 58.87 2.23 
Nigeria 2000 13.76 42.35 2.48 
Morocco 2010 18.12 56.68 1.78 
Cameroon 2005 18.53 48.54 1.05 
Ghana 2009 18.76 50.51 1.18 
Botswana 2001 19.21 54.04 2.31 
Mozambique 1997 20.89 27.37 2.43 
Libya 2010 22.37 77.56 1.62 
Benin 2010 22.72 44.26 2.98 
Ethiopia 2002 23.32 15.12 7.66 
Comoros 2000 24.08 28.08 1.82 
Swaziland 1997 25.05 22.88 1.36 
Mauritius 2009 27.52 41.86 1.32 
Tanzania 2010 28.29 26.28 5.30 
Malawi 2008 29.58 15.35 1.04 
Madagascar 2005 31.19 28.81 4.99 
Zambia 2010 31.44 38.73 3.51 
Sudan 2000 32.00 32.50 9.33 
Chad 2000 33.62 21.53 5.33 
Zimbabwe 2010 33.89 38.13 2.27 
Egypt 2000 35.29 42.80 2.00 
Uganda 2009 36.09 14.78 9.31 
Mali 1995 36.32 25.52 8.96 
Congo, DRC 2000 37.94 29.30 5.67 
Angola 2000 37.98 48.99 4.49 
Niger 2001 38.80 16.30 4.15 
Kenya 2009 39.06 23.19 5.46 
Sierra Leone 2010 39.98 38.88 4.08 
Namibia 2008 40.56 36.71 3.79 
Central African Republic 2000 41.57 37.64 4.18 
Cote D'Ivoire 2000 42.03 43.54 6.20 
Cape Verde 2009 42.17 61.00 3.52 
Lesotho 2005 42.98 23.28 2.91 
Somalia 2010 42.98 37.29 3.26 
Gambia 2007 45.97 54.54 4.32 
Equatorial Guinea 2005 46.28 38.88 1.11 
Guinea 1996 46.35 29.78 3.80 
Gabon 2000 49.57 80.11 5.30 
Mauretania 2008 51.06 40.88 11.02 
Burkina Faso 2006 52.18 22.36 3.21 
Burundi 2008 52.67 10.14 7.26 
Senegal 2010 53.67 42.25 10.85 
The Republic of Congo 2000 53.94 58.70 4.50 
Rwanda 2010 57.07 18.81 8.32 
Togo 2010 63.72 37.53 6.36 
Guine-Buissau 2009 67.97 42.49 17.23 
Eritrea 2000 72.52 17.62 7.54 
Liberia 2004 73.31 45.71 19.84 
Djibouti 2000 78.06 76.53 14.53 
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